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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation has long served as the jurisprudential basis for holding
that restrictions on broadcast indecency do not violate the First
Amendment.1 The technological context in which Pacifica arose
allowed the Court to gloss over the tension between two rather
disparate rationales. Those who take a civil libertarian view of free
speech could support the decision on the grounds that viewers’ and
listeners’ inability to filter out unwanted speech exposed them to
content that they did not wish to see or hear.2 At the same time,
Pacifica also found support from those who more paternalistically
regard indecency as low value (if not socially harmful) speech that
is unworthy of full First Amendment protection.3 The lack of any
effective means through which audiences could exercise control over
the content to which they were exposed obviated the need for courts
and commentators to resolve the tension between these two
disparate perspectives. 
More recently, technological developments have given audiences
greater control over the content that they see and hear. Innovations
such as the V-chip allow parents to exercise effective control over
indecent speech transmitted over the airwaves.4 Filtering tech-
nologies, deployed at the edge and in the core of the network, are
enhancing end users’ ability to keep out threats and unwanted
content on the Internet.5 The fact that audiences are now in a better
position to exercise control over the content to which they are
exposed has introduced a wedge between those who supported the
constitutionality of indecency regulations out of a desire to enhance
individual autonomy and more conservative voices who wish to re-
strict speech in the name of promoting the public good. At the same
time, commentators on the political left have begun to question
1. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978); see FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (“[W]e have never held that Pacifica represented
the outer limits of permissible regulation, so that fleeting expression may not be forbidden.”).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 9-14.
3. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra text accompanying note 169.
5. See infra text accompanying note 166.
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whether continued support for the classic liberal vision of free
speech may be interfering with the advancement of progressive
values.6
The return of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. to the Supreme
Court of the United States for a second time may provide the
opportunity to resolve this long-standing controversy. When the
case first appeared before the Court, the Justices upheld the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision to abandon its pre-
vious policy of enforcing broadcast indecency restrictions only
against deliberate and repetitive uses of profanity purely as a
matter of administrative law and remanded the case to the Second
Circuit so that it could address the underlying constitutional
issues.7 Now that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the
case for a second time, the Court will finally be in a position to
address the underlying First Amendment issues.8
This Article offers a qualified defense of the libertarian vision of
free speech associated with classical liberal theory. Not only would
deviating from the traditional view require a revolution in doctrine;
it would also bring the First Amendment into conflict with funda-
mental tenets of liberal and democratic theory to a greater extent
than is generally recognized. 
I. THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL VISION OF FREE SPEECH
The traditional conception of free speech embodied in the First
Amendment doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court is best
understood as being founded in classical liberal theory. At the risk
of oversimplifying, classical liberal theory posits that individuals are
independent moral agents capable of making up their own minds.9
In terms of free speech, this commitment to independent moral
agency entails that the state must respect individuals’ decisions
6. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 394-414.
7. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
8. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011).
9. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785); JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in
THREE ESSAYS 5, 17-18, 124-26 (Robert Wollheim ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1859).
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about what to say10 as well as their choices about the speech to
which they wish to be exposed.11
Many commentators similarly view this liberty-oriented commit-
ment to free speech as inherent in our society’s commitment to
democracy. Like liberalism more generally, democracy is premised
on the belief that individuals are capable of making judgments that
affect their own lives.12 Rejecting people’s ability to make their own
decisions about the speech to which they wish to be exposed thus
contradicts the very premise on which democratic systems of gov-
ernment are based.13 Indeed, if individuals’ judgments were not
worthy of respect, there would be little reason to respect the results
of elections.14
As such, independent moral agency is more properly regarded as
a foundational postulate than as an empirical claim. In other words,
it is more properly regarded as a quality theoretically ascribed to
individuals under liberal and democratic theory as a necessary con-
comitant of their status as repositories of liberty than as a descrip-
tive quality that may or may not exist empirically.15
In addition, classical liberalism reflects an inherent distrust of
state authority.16 As an initial matter, classical liberalism necessar-
ily presupposes the existence of a sphere of purely private action
into which the government cannot intrude.17 Classical liberalism
also regards the individual as being logically prior to the state and
10. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 991-92 (1978).
11. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 620-21 (1982).
12. See ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 277-78, 281-82 (1995).
13. See, e.g., id.; MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19-29
(1984).
14. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to
the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 324 (2003).
15. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 878, 890-93
(1994); see also POST, supra note 12, at 284 (“[T]he autonomy vel non of the subject of legal
regulation is presupposed in the very structure of law by which that subject is regulated.
From the point of view of the designer of the structure, therefore, the presence or absence of
autonomy functions as an axiomatic and foundational principle.”).
16. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 20-21 (1960); JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 410, 418-19 (1986); see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, PHILOSOPHICAL
ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 268 (3d ed. 2001) (“Liberalism embodies an
attitude of distrust toward use of the coercive power of the state.”).
17. POST, supra note 12, at 280; ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY 118, 124 (1969).
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assumes that individuals constitute the state through some type of
social contract.18 In other words, classical liberalism dictates that
the individuals are the subjects and the government the object, not
the other way around. 
The academic literature has launched two principal lines of
attack on the classical liberal vision of free speech. One prong criti-
cizes the continued reliance on individual preferences.19 The other
argues that private actors pose a greater threat to free speech than
the government.20
II. THE CRITIQUE OF PREFERENCES
Under the classical liberal view, end users’ enhanced ability to
exclude content they do not wish to see or hear weakens arguments
that restrictions of particular types of speech are constitutional. The
development of effective filters increases individuals’ ability to
ensure that they are exposed only to the content to which they wish
to be exposed. Some scholars have suggested, however, that tech-
nologies that give individuals greater control over media content are
not necessarily a cause for celebration. For example, Cass Sunstein
has argued that the mix of speech individuals should see ought to
reflect public values and not just their personal choices and that
low-value speech such as pornography should receive a lesser
degree of First Amendment protection.21 Sunstein further warned
that allowing individuals to personalize the content they receive
risks limiting the information that they receive to what Nicholas
Negroponte called the “Daily Me,” comprised exclusively of subjects
in which they are already interested and opinions with which they
are already inclined to agree.22 Lawrence Lessig raised the related
concern that the ability to limit people’s exposure to speech that
accords with their preferences will fragment audiences and expose
18. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52-55 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980) (1690).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 73-74, 210-26
(1st paperback ed. 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,
31-32 (1991).
22. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 3-4 (2007).
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them only to speech that reinforces their preexisting views of the
world.23
The argument for disregarding or disempowering individual pref-
erences is based on the claim that preferences are not simply the
exclusive product of each individual’s autonomy. Instead, they are
as much the product of the speech that already exists and the social
structure that created that speech.24 From this point of view, forcing
people to deviate from what they believe are their preferences is not
a violation of individual autonomy because those preferences derive
more from the media to which people have been exposed than the
“freely produced desire” that would exist if “more and better choices
[were] made available.”25 Conversely, honoring existing preferences
that are largely shaped by the nature of the content that already
exists would amount to nothing more than a circular perpetuation
of the status quo.
Critiquing preferences in this manner leads to a fairly illiberal
transformation in the justification for governmental intervention.26
From this perspective, the problem is not that individuals are un-
able to see only what they want; rather, the problem is that they
want the wrong things.27 Put another way, regulation is no longer
about market failure; it is about audience failure.
Overriding individual preferences in this manner is flatly incon-
sistent with classical liberal theory. Forcing audiences to experience
content that they would not willingly choose contradicts the premise
inherent in liberalism and democratic theory that individuals are
able to make their own decisions about the content they consume.
A. Idealized Preferences
How then can one justify forcing individuals to deviate from their
preferences? The classic solution is to argue that the coerced out-
come accords with the preferences that the individual would have
23. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 260-61 (2006).
24. SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 73-74.
25. Id. at 74; see also LESSIG, supra note 23, at 260 (noting that Sunstein “rejects the
notion that the mix of speech we see should solely be a function of individual choice” and
“would reject any architecture that makes consumer choice trump”).
26. See Yoo, supra note 14, at 322-24.
27. Id. at 323-24.
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held had she existed in a more idealized state of the world.28
Distilling such idealized preferences is precisely the purpose of
Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” which provides a mechanism for recon-
ciling more intrusive government policies with the central commit-
ments associated with liberalism.29 
The challenge is identifying a coherent set of substantive prin-
ciples and an institutional setting by which this idealized set of
preferences can be identified and defined. The normative attractive-
ness of any such regime thus depends on how clearly articulated
and analytically well-defended is any particular method for ascer-
taining what people would have wanted had they been exposed to
a richer set of stimuli. To date, however, the mechanisms proffered
for identifying idealized preferences have been frustratingly thin.
The lack of specificity runs the risk of providing the intellectual
cover for the imposition of naked normative preferences. And as
Isaiah Berlin noted, any error in determining what people ought to
want can lead to the decidedly illiberal result of coercing them to act
in accordance with what some third party asserts are their true best
interests.30 The result comes chillingly close to the Rousseauian
notion of being “forced to be free.”31
The question, then, is not whether the critique of preferences is
true, but rather whether obeying preferences that are actually held
is normatively more or less attractive than the proffered alternative.
Although it is theoretically possible that such a normative argument
might be compelling, thus far no one has articulated an approach for
determining ideal preferences.
B. Supreme Court Doctrine
Consistent with classical liberal theory, the Supreme Court has
consistently overturned governmental attempts to override individ-
ual preferences and to restrict access to speech that many regard as
28. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8-17 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1979) (1861) (defining liberty as the realization of the desires that a person would have held
if she had been exposed to a more complete range of experiences).
29. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
30. BERLIN, supra note 17, at 131-34.
31. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES 163, 177 (G. D. H. Cole trans., 1973) (1762).
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low value. The most recent example is Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, decided on June 27, 2011, in which the Court
struck down a California statute requiring the labeling of violent
video games and preventing their sale to minors.32 The Court began
by noting that “[u]nder our Constitution, ‘esthetic and moral judg-
ments about art and literature ... are for the individual to make, not
for the Government to decree even with the mandate or approval of
a majority.’”33 The constitutionality of the statute was further
undermined by the existence of a voluntary rating system that
enabled parents to filter out any content.34 In so reasoning, the
Court flatly rejected the position that the government can override
individual preferences and embraced the classical liberal vision of
free speech focusing on individual control.
Just the previous year, in United States v. Stevens, the Court
similarly rejected a federal statute designed to criminalize “crush
videos,” which typically depict killing animals by stepping on
them.35 In so holding, the Court rejected arguments that the First
Amendment permitted restricting such speech because the legisla-
ture concluded that it lacked expressive value. The First Amend-
ment presumptively protects all speech, not just that speech that
the Court determines is sufficiently worthwhile under an ad hoc
balancing test.36
Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court declared
unconstitutional an attempt to criminalize virtual child pornog-
raphy, that is, child pornography generated through the use of com-
puter imaging rather than actual models.37 The fact that such
depictions are widely regarded as low value speech did not justify
the restriction. The Court noted, “the First Amendment bars the
government from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear.”38
Moreover, the fact that society may regard some speech as offensive
32. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
33. Id. at 2733 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818
(2000)).
34. Id. at 2740-41.
35. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
36. Id. at 1585.
37. 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002).
38. Id. at 245.
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does not justify restricting it.39 Although the Court had previously
upheld a ban on child pornography produced by photographing
actual children, it did so not because of its assessment of the value
of the images but rather because of the adverse impact that pro-
ducing child pornography can have on children. The restrictions
were constitutional because “the production of the work, not its
content, was the target of the statute.”40 This reasoning, however,
did not extend to justify prohibiting virtual child pornography,
which “records no crime and creates no victims by its production.”41
The Supreme Court’s recent First Amendment decisions thus
betray little willingness to uphold restrictions that seek to override
individuals’ preferences. Consistent with liberal theory, whenever
the government has attempted to displace individual control and
substitute its judgment in the name of some greater good, the Court
has held the government’s action unconstitutional. The line of
authority culminating in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n
and the additional decisions discussed below42 has taken a particu-
larly dim view of such regulations when filtering technologies
existed that enabled individuals to determine for themselves the
speech to which they are exposed. The overall run of Supreme Court
decisions thus appears to be consistent with classical liberal theory
and to contradict any vision of the First Amendment that would
permit the government to override individuals’ actual preferences
in the name of furthering some externally determined conception of
which speech is worthwhile.
III. THE THREAT OF “PRIVATE CENSORSHIP” AND THE CRITIQUE OF
THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Other scholars have taken a somewhat different tack. Instead of
attacking audiences’ preferences, they argued that censorship by
private intermediaries can be as dangerous to free speech as censor-
ship by the government. In making such arguments, these scholars
39. Id. Indeed, the Court recognized that “some works in this category might have
significant value.” Id. at 251 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982)).
40. Id. at 249.
41. Id. at 250.
42. See infra notes 149-75 and accompanying text.
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tapped into the long tradition, most closely associated with the
Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s,43 critiquing the
public-private distinction and arguing that private power can be an
even greater threat to liberty than public power.44
The key doctrinal obstacle to these arguments is the state action
doctrine. The state action doctrine has long been regarded as a
central tenet of classical liberal thought, which postulates the
existence of an area of individual freedom that is logically prior to
the state and into which the state cannot intrude.45 In this way, the
state action doctrine protects the individual from the coercive power
of the state while ensuring at the same time that the private auton-
omy implicit in liberal theory is not subjected to the exercise of
public power.46 The public-private distinction inherent in the state
action doctrine is also implicit in democracy, which presupposes the
existence of a realm within which each individual can engage in
self-determination.47 It is for this reason that even proponents of
abandoning the state action doctrine recognize that doing so would
represent nothing less than a revolution.48
43. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Morris R.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale,
Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 149 (1935).
44. LESSIG, supra note 23, at 233, 261, 317-19; TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE
AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 300-03 (2010). The first edition of Lessig’s book explicitly
based this argument on the work of media scholars Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein. LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 275 n.1 (1999).
45. See BERLIN, supra note 17, at 124.
46. See Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are
Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 3-4 (2004) (“[T]he state action requirement preserves the
public-private dichotomy that is central to liberal democratic theory by assuring that the
constitutional constraints imposed on public power do not spill over into and restrict the scope
of free choice within the core private sphere.”); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko,
Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145, 1163 (2004) (“The state action
doctrine is important because it assures the maintenance of the public/private dichotomy that
lies at the very heart of liberal democratic theory.”).
47. POST, supra note 12, at 280-82; see also STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF
ANTILIBERALISM 209 (1993) (“[T]he liberal distinction between public and private ... may be
a necessary precondition for the democratization of public life”); Steven G. Gey, The Case
Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 242 (1996) (arguing that “the
public/private distinction” and “some separation between the governors and the governed” is
necessary to democracy).
48. LESSIG, supra note 23, at 319.
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More fundamentally, the attack on the state action doctrine
ignores the long-standing First Amendment tradition, present in the
work of John Austin49 and John Milton,50 recognizing that restric-
tions imposed by government actors represent a greater threat to
liberty than restrictions imposed by private actors. The Court
offered its most ringing statement of this tradition in CBS v.
Democratic National Committee, which represented a key turning
point in the Court’s decision not to abandon the state action
doctrine.51 The Court explicitly weighed the relative dangers of
public and private censorship and concluded that the former
represented the greater evil. As the Court noted, “Congress appears
to have concluded ... that of these two choices—private or official
censorship—Government censorship would be the most pervasive,
the most self-serving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the
one most to be avoided.”52 The fact that private censorship was a
potential threat did not alter the Court’s conclusion:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing
is selection and choice of material. That editors—newspaper or
broadcast—can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but
that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress provided.
Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher
values. The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors
of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality that these risks were
evils for which there was no acceptable remedy.53
Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion similarly called government
control “the greater of two evils,” noting, “Of course there is private
censorship in the newspaper field. But if the Government is the
censor, administrative fiat, not freedom of choice, carries the day.”54
49. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (Library of Ideas ed. 1954) (1832).
50. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Adament Media Corp. 2006) (1644).
51. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). For an insightful analysis of the Supreme Court’s state action
jurisprudence, see Sophia Z. Lee, “Almost Revolutionary”: The Constitution’s Strange Career
in the Workplace, 1935-1980 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file
with Yale University Library).
52. CBS, 412 U.S. at 105.
53. Id. at 124-25.
54. Id. at 153 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Classical liberal theory has thus long held that governmental
control over content poses greater risks to liberty than control over
content exercised by private individuals. The failure to appreciate
the distinction between public and private exercises of editorial
control has been a persistent source of confusion. Consider, for ex-
ample, the reaction to Hillary Clinton’s recent criticism of China’s
policy of suppressing certain Internet content. Some advocates
attempted to characterize her speech as an endorsement of a
regulatory initiative known as “network neutrality,” which focuses
on limiting broadband access providers’ ability to exercise control
over the traffic flowing through their networks.55 It would be a
mistake to equate calls for the end of state-sponsored censorship
with advocacy of restrictions on private exercises of editorial control.
Saying that governments should not interfere with content is a far
cry from saying that governments should be able to limit private
actors’ ability to do so. The former position is consistent with clas-
sical liberal theory, whereas the latter position is not.
Stated somewhat more generally, early predictions that the
Internet would allow speakers to communicate directly with their
audiences never came to fruition. Simply put, end users cannot be
expected to crawl the entire Internet every morning to see what new
content has appeared overnight. Instead, they rely on some third
party, such as a blogger, e-mail newsletter, or search engine, to help
them identify and facilitate access to desired content. In short, it is
inevitable that private actors will exercise some degree of editorial
control over the content that is available over the Internet. The
question is not if someone will serve that role. The proper question
is who.
A. Exception: Scarcity in Broadcasting
Despite the fact that classical liberal theory typically does not
support governmental restrictions on private editorial choices, the
Supreme Court has upheld some content regulations imposed out of
concern that private actors might wield their editorial discretion
in a way that impedes some other person’s ability to speak. The
55. See, e.g., Press Release, Public Knowledge, Public Knowledge Commends Hillary
Clinton on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2867.
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leading case in this line of authority is the Court’s 1969 decision in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, in which the Court upheld an
FCC regulation requiring broadcasters that endorse political
candidates to give their opponents a right of reply.56 The Court
noted that before the government began licensing broadcast stations
in 1927, “the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private
sector, and the result was chaos.”57 The only solution was for the
government to regulate and rationalize this “scarce resource,”
because “[w]ithout government control, the medium would be of
little use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of
which could be clearly and predictably heard.”58
Had the government simply assigned frequencies to particular
users and then ensured that others did not trespass on their usage,
its actions would have raised no serious First Amendment concerns.
The next step in the Court’s analysis, however, made its conclusion
quite controversial. The Court concluded that because more people
wanted to use broadcast channels than there were available, the
government could require anyone who received channels “to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his community and
which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.”59
The alternative would create “unlimited private censorship” in
which “station owners and a few networks would have unfettered
power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to com-
municate only their own views on public issues, people and candi-
dates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed.”60
In the words of the Supreme Court decision first enunciating this
rationale, the government was no mere “traffic officer, policing the
wave lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other.”61
The government also bore “the burden of determining the composi-
tion of that traffic.”62 Justice Stewart’s concurrence in CBS put the
matter succinctly:
56. 395 U.S. 367, 374-75, 378, 391-92 (1969).
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id. at 376; see also id. at 388.
59. Id. at 389.
60. Id. at 392.
61. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
62. Id. at 216.
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Scarcity meant more than a need to limit access. Because access
was to be limited, it was thought necessary for the regulatory
apparatus to take into account the public interest in obtaining
“the best practicable service to the community reached by his
[the licensee’s] broadcasts.” Public regulation has not, then, been
merely a matter of electromagnetic engineering for the sake of
keeping signals clear. It has also included some regulation of
programming.63
Characterizing broadcast channels as scarce “turn[s] speech into
a zero-sum game” in which enabling any one person to speak
inevitably crowds out another’s ability to do so.64 This in turn serves
two purposes. First, by suggesting that the total amount of speech
is strictly limited, this characterization attempts to foreclose the
classic argument that the solution to low-value or dangerous speech
is more speech, not government regulation.65 Indeed, it was used as
a justification to take licenses away from WEVD (a socialist-
oriented station named after Eugene V. Debs) and WCFL (a labor-
oriented station named after the Chicago Federation of Labor) on
the grounds that limited airwaves could not be used solely for
“propaganda.”66 Second, the zero-sum aspect permits the Court to
take what would otherwise be regarded as private actors to whom
the First Amendment did not apply and recharacterize them as
public functionaries acting as agents in the service of larger public
objectives.67
The scarcity doctrine has been subjected to an extensive ana-
lytical critique.68 As Ronald Coase noted in his 1959 article that
provided the impetus for his landmark 1960 article laying out the
63. CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 135 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(citation omitted). 
64. Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 730 (2010) [hereinafter Yoo, Free Speech]; see also
Christopher S. Yoo, The Role of Politics and Policy in Television Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J.
255, 261 (2004).
65. For the classic statement of this principle, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”).
66. See Yoo, Free Speech, supra note 64, at 763-65.
67. See POST, supra note 12, at 280-82.
68. For a review, see Yoo, supra note 14, at 267-69; Yoo, Free Speech, supra note 64, at
729-37.
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Coase theorem, the fact that a spectrum is economically scarce fails
to distinguish it from any other commodity.69 The problem is really
one of interference between inconsistent uses, and that problem can
be resolved simply by creating property rights and a market through
which those rights can be exchanged.70 To conclude that interference
requires direct government allocation and reallocation is, in the
words of one of the scarcity doctrine’s leading critics, a “public policy
non sequitur.”71
On a more fundamental level, allowing scarcity to turn private
actors into state actors who do not enjoy the freedom from state
coercion associated with the First Amendment could have drastic
implications. It would justify direct government regulation of the
speech of any communications entity with a dominant market share.
Perhaps concerned by this possibility, the Supreme Court soon
began to back away from the scarcity doctrine, beginning with its
1974 decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.72 Tornillo
involved a challenge to a state statute that required newspapers
that endorsed political candidates to give their opponents a right of
reply, a mandate almost directly analogous to the right of reply
upheld in Red Lion. In contrast to Red Lion, however, the Tornillo
Court struck down the restrictions as an impermissible intrusion
into the newspaper’s editorial discretion.73 It did so even though the
economics had changed so that each city could support only a single
newspaper.74
Tornillo clearly signaled that mere economic scarcity, even nat-
ural monopoly, did not justify abrogating a media conduit’s First
Amendment rights. What was missing was how to reconcile this
outcome with the Court’s Red Lion decision, issued just five years
before. Indeed, given the similarity of the issues, many observers
were quite surprised that the Tornillo opinion did not mention Red
69. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959)
(“Land, labor, and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for government
regulation.”).
70. Id. at 25-35.
71. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33
J.L. & ECON. 133, 138 (1990).
72. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
73. Id. at 258.
74. Id. at 249, 251.
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Lion at all.75 Although subsequent decisions cited both decisions,
they did so simply to state the black letter proposition that rights of
reply are constitutional with respect to broadcasting, but not with
respect to newspapers, without engaging in any serious attempt to
reconcile their rationales.76
The Court finally began to shed light on the tension between Red
Lion and Tornillo in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
(Turner I).77 At issue was a statutory provision known as “must
carry,” which required all cable operators to provide free carriage to
all full-power local television broadcast stations.78 The Court began
by noting that in enacting this statute, “Congress found that the
physical characteristics of cable transmission, compounded by the
increasing concentration of economic power in the cable industry,
are endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast television
stations to compete for a viewing audience.”79 In particular, for 60
percent of American households, cable had become the exclusive
source of television programming.80 Moreover, “local franchising
requirements and the extraordinary expense of constructing more
than one cable television system to serve a particular geographic
75. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE L.J. 361, 364 (1976); Jerome
A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from First Amendment Doctrine: Justice
Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817, 870 (1998); Yochai Benkler,
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 371 (1999); Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech,
54 DUKE L.J. 1359, 1382 (2005); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 465 n.144 (1996);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional
Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 156; Glen O. Robinson, The
Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 910-11 (1998). An
attempt to search the Blackmun papers for an explanation as to why Tornillo did not cite Red
Lion failed to yield any fruit. Angela J. Campbell, A Historical Perspective on the Public’s
Right of Access to Media, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1027, 1086, 1091-94 (2007).
76. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 557 n.1 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
791 n.30 (1978).
77. 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Yoo, Free Speech, supra note 64, at 745.
78. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 630.
79. Id. at 632-33. For an earlier analysis of the implications of Turner I, see Yoo, Free
Speech, supra note 64, at 744-50.
80. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 633 (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, §§ 2(a)(3), (17), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460).
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area” dictated that the overwhelming majority of cities were served
by a single cable operator.81
Notwithstanding this high level of local concentration in the
cable industry, the Court began its First Amendment analysis by
refusing to extend the scarcity doctrine to cable television.82 Not
only had the scarcity doctrine been heavily criticized with respect to
broadcasting,83 but “cable television [did] not suffer from the in-
herent limitations that characterize[d] the broadcast medium.”84
Compared with broadcasting, cable enjoyed far greater channel ca-
pacity and did not suffer from the same danger of physical interfer-
ence between speakers.85
Even more telling is the manner in which Turner I distinguished
Tornillo. After laying out two considerations that were not expressly
technological,86 the Court focused on “an important technological
difference between newspapers and cable television.”87 Even though
81. Id. (quoting § 2(a)(2)).
82. Id. at 637.
83. Id. at 638 & n.5. In this regard, Turner I represents one interesting episode in the
scarcity doctrine’s interesting history. Some have taken the language in Turner I—declining
to question the scarcity doctrine’s validity with respect to broadcasting—as an implicit
endorsement of the scarcity doctrine. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d
1027, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (adhering to the scarcity doctrine in part because “[t]he Supreme
Court has already heard the empirical case against that rationale and still ‘declined to
question its continuing validity’” (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 638)). Others regard Turner
I as signaling the Court’s dissatisfaction with the scarcity doctrine by focusing on the
language noting the longstanding criticism of the doctrine and the Court’s refusal to extend
the doctrine to cable. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104
YALE L.J. 1757, 1769 (1995). Even more interesting is the extent to which the scarcity doctrine
may have become embroiled in judicial politics. One commentator suggests that the reason
Tornillo made no mention of Red Lion is because any attempt to reconcile Tornillo with Red
Lion would have validated the distinction between broadcast and nonbroadcast media, and
Justice Douglas did not want to provide any support for Red Lion. See FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE
GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN
BROADCASTING 195 (1976). In contrast, the Court went out of its way to endorse Red Lion in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-67 (1990), in order to obtain Justice
White’s vote in a key affirmative action case. See Neal E. Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 128 n.21 (1990); Charles Fried, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 126 (1990).
84. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 639.
85. See id.
86. Specifically, the Court found Tornillo distinguishable because the restriction at issue
was content neutral and would not force cable operators to alter their own messages as a
result of the additional programming they were required to carry. Id. at 655-56.
87. Id. at 656.
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newspapers often enjoy natural monopolies in their cities, they
cannot prevent rival publications from attempting to offer compet-
ing content.88 Cable television, in contrast, employs a physical
connection that gives cable operators “bottleneck, or gatekeeper,
control” over all content entering subscribers’ homes.89 “A cable
operator, unlike speakers in other media, can thus silence the voice
of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.”90 It is cable
operators’ ability to “restrict, through physical control of a critical
pathway of communication, the free flow of information and ideas”
that distinguished must carry from the right of reply at issue in
Tornillo.91 Under these circumstances, the First Amendment did not
prevent the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests did not restrict other private speakers from expressing
themselves.92
Turner I established two points relevant for present purposes.
First, the Court indicated its reluctance to extend the scarcity doc-
trine to any other technology.93 The opinion demonstrated this
principle explicitly with its quotation from an earlier decision
stating, “[o]ur decisions have recognized that the special interest of
the Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does
not readily translate into a justification for regulation of other
means of communication.”94 The decision thus falls comfortably into
a long line of rulings refusing to extend the scarcity doctrine to other
media, such as the Internet and direct mail.95 
Second, Turner I made clear that mere economic scarcity did not
justify restricting a media outlet’s editorial discretion even if that
outlet enjoyed a natural monopoly.96 Indeed, any other conclusion
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 639.
91. Id. at 657.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 639.
94. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
95. Yoo, supra note 14, at 288-90. For the decision refusing to extend the scarcity doctrine
to the Internet, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 870 (1997). For decisions refusing to
extend scarcity to direct mail, see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
475 U.S. 1, 10 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 542-43 (1980); and Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74.
96. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656.
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would indicate that Tornillo was wrongly decided. The existence of
bottleneck control over an exclusive physical connection, rather than
any economic condition, was what justified deviating from estab-
lished First Amendment principles.97 This second point, in turn,
makes clearer the precise relationship between changes in technol-
ogy and free speech. The clear implication is that if a media outlet
does not control an exclusive physical connection, the Turner I gate-
keeper rationale does not apply.98
Technological changes have now largely eroded the empirical
foundation needed to apply the gatekeeper rationale to cable tele-
vision.99 Cable television providers now face fierce competition
from direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers Dish Network and
DirecTV, which serve the entire country.100 As of December 2010,
DBS now controls more than 31 percent of all multichannel video
subscribers, with DirecTV capturing 18 percent and Dish Network
capturing 13 percent.101 Together, these providers more than double
the 15 percent threshold established by Congress for determining
whether cable faced effective competition for the purposes of elim-
inating rate regulation.102 The national numbers largely reflect
market shares on a city-by-city basis. As of mid-2009, DirecTV’s
share of video subscribers exceeded 15 percent in 181 out of 211
designated marketing areas (DMAs), whereas the Dish Network’s
share exceeded 15 percent in 132 out of 211 DMAs.103 
97. Id.
98. Yoo, Free Speech, supra note 64, at 747-50.
99. Id.
100. Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 708
n.184 (2005).
101. For the number of subscribers for DirecTV and the Dish Network, see Top 25
Multichannel Video Programming Distributors as of Dec. 2010, NAT’L CABLE &
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION, http://www.ncta.com/Stats/TopMSOs.aspx (last visited
Oct. 12, 2011). For the total number of multichannel video subscribers, see Industry Data,
NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMS. ASS’N, http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx (last visited Oct.
12, 2011) (reporting data as of the end of 2010). The number of subscribers served by non-top
twenty-five cable operators aligns with data collected by the FCC. Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual
Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 684 tbl.B-1 (2009).
102. 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
103. Comments of Christopher S. Yoo at 13, Applications of Comcast Corp., General
Electric Co. and NBC Universal, Inc., for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control
of Licenses, 25 FCC Rcd. 2651 (Mar. 18, 2010) (MB Docket 10-56), available at http://fjallfoss.
fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020472619.
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In addition, new multichannel video offerings from traditional
telephone companies, such as Verizon FiOS and AT&T U-verse,
have captured roughly 6 percent of the market.104 Moreover, an
increasing number of households are abandoning multichannel
video altogether and relying exclusively on over-the-air broadcasting
and Internet-based video services.105 The effect has been dramatic.
In the second quarter of 2010, the cable industry lost subscribers
compared to the same period the year before, which marked the first
such instance in the history of the cable industry.106 These losses
accelerated during the third quarter of 2010, during which the
industry lost nearly 750,000 subscribers.107 Industry observers
expect these trends to continue.108
Although the market for Internet service is not as competitive as
many would like, it has not devolved into the type of exclusivity that
would bring it within the ambit of Turner I.109 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized, “the market for high-speed Internet service
is now quite competitive,” with “DSL providers fac[ing] stiff compe-
tition from cable companies and wireless and satellite providers.”110
More recently, cable modem and DSL have faced increasingly fierce
competition from new technologies such as fiber-to-the-home and
wireless broadband.111 The most recent data indicate that wireless
broadband is growing rapidly and by some measures has now
eclipsed both cable modem and DSL as the leading broadband
access technology.112
104. This calculation is based on the sources cited supra note 101.
105. See Rob Pegoraro, Joy of Free TV, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2011, at G4.
106. See David Lieberman, Is It Time To Cut the Cord on Cable TV?: Web, Other Options
Begin To Shake Up Home Viewing, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2001, at 1A (examining data from the
second and third quarters of 2010).
107. See Andy Vuong, The Coming Battle for Your Television, DENV. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at
K1 (reporting that cable operators lost 741,000 basic cable subscribers during the third
quarter of 2010).
108. See Lieberman, supra note 106 (reporting SNL Kagan predictions that by 2014, 46.3
million households will have at least one television attached to an Internet connection and
that 7 percent of households will get their video exclusively from the web).
109. Yoo, Free Speech, supra note 64, at 747-50.
110. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 n.2 (2009).
111. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access,
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9-10 (2008).
112. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31,
2009, at 23 tbl.7, 29-30 tbls.11 & 12 (Dec. 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-303405A1.pdf.
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The presence of intermodal competition between broadband
access providers has led courts to hold the gatekeeper rationale
articulated in Turner I inapplicable to the Internet.113 The increase
in intermodal competition has, however, led courts and agencies to
remove access requirements from Internet providers in a wide vari-
ety of other contexts.114 Indeed, even commentators sympathetic
toward imposing access requirements recognize that the rationale
established by Turner I cannot justify directly imposing such re-
quirements on the Internet.115 
In short, the scarcity and physical bottleneck doctrines, long
invoked to justify imposing regulations to limit broadcasters’ and
cable operators’ ability to serve as gatekeepers, are weakening with
respect to those technologies. They also have no purchase on new
technologies, such as the Internet.
B. Exception: Broadcasting as Intruder
The Supreme Court has recognized another exception to broadcast-
ers’ unfettered right to speak freely. The seminal case in this line of
jurisprudence is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, in which the Court
upheld an FCC order disapproving of an avant garde radio station’s
decision to air George Carlin’s Filthy Words monologue using seven
words that had supposedly been banned from the public airwaves.116
113. Comcast Cablevision of Broward Cnty., Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 124 F. Supp. 2d 685,
696 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
114. See linkLine, 555 U.S. at 447-48 (noting that intermodal competition obviated any
duty by the telephone company under the antitrust laws to provide access to its competitors);
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that “the robust
competition ... in the broadband market” between DSL, cable modems, wireless broadband,
and other technologies undercut the rationale for subjecting the DSL-capable portions of
telephone loops to the unbundled access regime created by the Telecommunications Act of
1996); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Report, Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,883–87 ¶¶ 55–64
(2005) (ruling that competition in the market for broadband access justified removing all DSL-
related elements from the unbundling requirements established by the 1996 Act), petition for
rev. denied sub nom. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007).
115. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1765
(1995) (“Turner is quite different from imaginable future cases involving new information
technologies, including the Internet, which includes no bottleneck problem.”).
116. 438 U.S. 726, 730, 741 (1978). The FCC elected not to impose formal sanctions on
Pacifica but indicated that it could have done so and that it would note the violation in
Pacifica’s file for consideration should repeat violations occur. Id. at 730.
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The Court acknowledged that “the fact that society may find speech
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is
the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a rea-
son for according it constitutional protection.”117 
The Court nonetheless invoked two reasons for upholding the
FCC’s authority to restrict indecent broadcasts. The first was not
technologically specific: the Court concluded that the speech was of
such slight social value that it did not merit protection, although
this portion of Justice Stevens’s opinion did not command a majority
of the Court.118 
In the second and more important rationale, the Court began by
noting that “each medium of expression presents special First
Amendment problems,” further noting that “of all forms of commu-
nication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection.”119 In particular, the lower level of First
Amendment protection is derived from two considerations directly
tied to individuals’ inability to assert control over the media they
receive: (1) broadcasting’s “uniquely pervasive presence in the lives
of all Americans” and (2) the fact that broadcasting is “uniquely
accessible to children.”120 In each case, individuals’ inability to limit
their and their children’s exposure to unwanted content justified the
restriction.121 With regard to pervasiveness, the Court characterized
broadcast indecency as an “intruder” that “confronts the citizen ...
in the privacy of the home” without warning.122 With respect to
accessibility to children, the existing technology did not allow
indecent content to “be withheld from the young without restricting
the expression at its source.”123
As I have discussed at some length elsewhere, commentators have
heavily criticized these rationales.124 Contrary to the majority’s
suggestion, the fact that people buy radios and television sets and
activate them of their own volition makes it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to characterize broadcasting as any more of an intruder than
117. Id. at 745.
118. Id. at 746-48 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 748.
120. Id. at 748, 749.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 748.
123. Id. at 749.
124. See Yoo, supra note 14, at 293-98.
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any other medium.125 Although a line of Supreme Court decisions
recognizes an exception for radio broadcasts on street cars,126 the
Court has explicitly recognized that broadcast audiences in other
contexts do not constitute the type of captive audience that falls
within these precedents because “[t]he radio can be turned off, but
not so the billboard or street car placard.”127 Or as Frederick
Schauer so trenchantly observed, “[t]urning off a radio is much
easier than averting your eyes from someone who is in the same
room. Just try it sometime.”128 
Moreover, allowing the fact that some people may be offended by
some broadcast speech to justify limiting that speech would allow
the sensibilities of the most sensitive person in the audience to
determine the level of the discourse. Instead, people confronting
offensive material are supposed to change the channel,129 turn off
the set,130 or (in the case of visual media) “avoid further bombard-
ment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”131 Such
125. Id. at 294. As Scot Powe drily noted:
Whatever else the Court means, it is not true that the FBI or CIA breaks into
millions of American homes to deposit the latest Sony radios in bedrooms and
living areas. To the best of my knowledge, Americans bring radios and television
sets into their homes because they desire them.... If homeowners truly believed
that radio or television was an intruder, I would expect to see sets out on the
streets for garbage collection. Instead, when I read my morning paper I see
numbers of full-page ads for these very appliances, suggesting that the
merchants believe, contrary to what the Court might think, that Americans
desire radios and televisions.
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 210 (1987).
126. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 465 (1952).
127. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932); see also CBS v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1975) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing Pollak); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting the same language from Packer with
approval).
128. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 294 (1981).
129. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (noting that giving
individuals the right to block junk mail is no more problematic than “a radio or television
viewer twist[ing] the dial to cut off an offensive or boring communication and thus bar its
entering his home”).
130. Packer Corp., 285 U.S. at 110 (noting that unlike a billboard on a street car, “[t]he
radio can be turned off”).
131. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The Court later quoted this language with
approval. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 630 (1995); Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
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burdens are the price paid for living in a robust society. In addition,
broadcasting is no more accessible to children than other media
such as books and newspapers that clearly receive First Amendment
protection.132 Moreover, allowing the possibility that some children
might be exposed to indecent speech to justify banning it altogether
would impermissibly “reduce the adult population ... to reading only
what is fit for children.”133 
These standard First Amendment principles were reflected in
Justice Brennan’s dissent in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, which
noted that turning on a radio represents the decision “to take part
... in an ongoing public discourse.”134 Those encountering something
they find distasteful should simply turn the radio off.135 Any con-
trary rule risks limiting adults to what is “fit for children” and takes
judgments about content out of the hands of individuals and gives
it instead to the government.136 
Following this reasoning, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to extend Pacifica to any other medium.137 Subsequent
developments have raised doubts as to its continuing vitality even
with respect to broadcasting.138 The most salient recent development
was FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., which arose from the
FCC’s decision to abandon its “fleeting expletives” policy, which had
previously indicated that uses of profanity would not be actionable
unless used repeatedly.139 In invalidating the change in policy as
arbitrary and capricious, the Court of Appeals had indicated that it
was “skeptical” that any justification for the policy “would pass
447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975). 
132. Yoo, supra note 14, at 293-94.
133. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). The Court has frequently quoted this
language with approval. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997); Sable
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73; Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
134. 438 U.S. 726, 764-65 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 765.
136. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 766, 769.
137. Yoo, supra note 14, at 298-301 (noting the Court’s refusal to extend Pacifica to junk
mail, telephone, cable television, and the Internet). Since then, lower courts have refused to
extend Pacifica to other media. E.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 646,
650 (7th Cir. 2006) (dealing with video games).
138. See Yoo, supra note 14, at 301-03.
139. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1805-07 (2009).
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constitutional muster.”140 The Supreme Court reversed without
addressing the First Amendment issues on the grounds that the
change in policy did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act.141
The two Justices who discussed the First Amendment in their
separate opinions both expressed their doubts. Justice Ginsburg was
rather restrained in her criticism, simply noting “that there is no
way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment casts over what
the Commission has done.”142 Justice Thomas was more explicit,
challenging Pacifica’s analytical coherence as well as its empirical
foundations.143 
A close reading of this line of precedent reveals that the outcome
in each case turned upon empirical assessments of the available
technologies of control.144 In Sable Communications, the Court ruled
Pacifica inapplicable to dial-a-porn in part because the would-be
recipient had to take affirmative steps before receiving the commu-
nication.145 Moreover, the existence of reasonably effective filtering
technologies that could prevent minors from obtaining access to
indecent speech rendered the restriction unconstitutional.146 
Similarly, when assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on
Internet indecency in Reno v. ACLU, the fact that Internet commu-
nications require affirmative steps before they appear and are
typically preceded by warnings brought the Internet within the
ambit of Sable instead of Pacifica.147 The existence of reasonably
effective end-user filtering software that enabled parents to prevent
children from accessing sexually explicit Internet content rendered
government imposed restrictions unconstitutional.148
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., the Court
recognized that its precedents acknowledged that “the feasibility of
a technological approach to controlling minors’ access to [indecent]
140. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct.
1800 (2009).
141. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1819.
142. Id. at 1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1820-22 & n.* (Thomas, J., concurring).
144. Yoo, supra note 14, at 303-06; Yoo, Free Speech, supra note 64, at 737-39.
145. 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989).
146. Id. at 128-31.
147. 521 U.S. 844, 869-70 (1997).
148. Id. at 877, 879.
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messages” rendered blanket bans unconstitutional.149 In addition,
the fact that access to sexually explicit material required affirmative
steps also tended to undercut the government’s authority to restrict
access to indecent material through that medium.150 The existence
of a potentially effective means by which indecent material could be
blocked on request on a house-by-house basis represented a less
restrictive means sufficient to render a blanket ban unconstitu-
tional.151
The Court’s emphasis on end-user control is also underscored by
a comparison of two older Supreme Court cases involving junk mail
advertisements for contraceptives. In Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Department, the Court upheld a statute giving households the power
to require that their names be taken off mailing lists used by com-
panies advertising products the householder regarded as erotically
arousing or sexually provocative.152 In so doing, the Court embraced
a vision in which each “householder [is] the exclusive and final judge
of what will cross his threshold.”153 The Court later reaffirmed the
constitutionality of technologies that enhance end-user choice in
other cases.154
The Court came to a very different conclusion in Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp. when, instead of trying to promote filtering in
a way that enhanced individual choice, the government tried to ban
unsolicited direct mail contraceptive advertisements altogether.155
The fact that some recipients may regard such advertisements as
offensive was not sufficient to justify suppressing them.156 Those
who are offended can simply avert their eyes or discard their mail.
As the Court noted, “the ‘short, though regular, journey from mail
box to trash can ... is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the
Constitution is concerned.’”157 
149. 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
150. Id. at 815.
151. Id. at 816-26.
152. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
153. Id. at 736.
154. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987) (upholding a statute requiring that
certain materials be labeled as “political propaganda” because measures that “better enable
the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda” promote First Amendment values).
155. 463 U.S. 60 (1983); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02
(1977) (declaring unconstitutional a ban on advertisement of contraceptives).
156. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71.
157. Id. at 72 (quoting Lamont v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883
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With respect to protecting children, the presence of reasonably
effective technologies of control rendered an outright ban imper-
missible. Because parents can easily pick up the mail before their
children do, “[w]e can reasonably assume that parents already
exercise substantial control” over whether their children are ex-
posed to such advertisements.158 In addition, the filtering procedure
upheld in Rowan represented a less restrictive means for accom-
plishing the same thing. The fact that Rowan upheld a statute
enhancing end-user control to keep out such mailings did not mean
that the government could ban the mailings outright.159 On the
contrary, the presence of such a regime made such a ban more
problematic. Any other restriction would “reduce the adult popula-
tion ... to reading only what is fit for children”160 and would relegate
“[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox ... to that which would
be suitable for a sandbox.”161 
In the process, the Bolger Court explicitly distinguished Pacifica,
noting that the Pacifica Court “‘emphasize[d] the narrowness of our
holding’” and reasoning that “[t]he receipt of mail is far less in-
trusive and uncontrollable” than the receipt of broadcast program-
ming.162
Together these decisions provide a roadmap for determining how
technologies of control affect the constitutional analysis. When the
medium permits indecent speech to appear unbidden and without
warning, and technologies enabling individuals to filter out un-
wanted content do not exist, it is at least arguable that restrictions
on indecent speech might be constitutional,163 although the growing
questions about the vitality of Pacifica raises serious doubts as to
this conclusion.164 What is clear is that Pacifica has no colorable
application when end users must take affirmative steps to access
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d summarily, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967)); accord Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 631 (1995) (quoting Bolger with approval).
158. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73.
159. Id. at 72.
160. Id. at 73 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). As noted supra note
131, the Court has often quoted this phrase from Butler with approval.
161. Id. at 74; see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 604 (2002) (quoting this language
with approval); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (same).
162. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750) (alteration in original).
163. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
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content and when effective filters exist. As such, this line of au-
thority represents a strong reaffirmation of the Court’s commitment
to the classical liberal vision of free speech.
These considerations make it extremely unlikely that courts will
extend Pacifica to new media. As noted earlier, the courts have been
reluctant to hold Pacifica applicable to other transmission technolo-
gies.165 In particular, Reno v. ACLU squarely held Pacifica inappli-
cable to the Internet, in part because of the availability of effective
filtering technologies and in part because the Internet has histori-
cally been a “pull” technology that requires affirmative steps in
order to receive content rather than a “push” technology whereby
the content is determined by a third party.166 Of course, the Reno
decision was necessarily contingent on the nature of the Internet in
1997. The web-dominated Internet of the mid-1990s is giving way
to one dominated by more sophisticated applications that pro-
actively retrieve content without actions taken by end users and
may require new filtering technologies.167 The ultimate disposition
will depend on the state of technology at the time of decision. 
Significant doubts exist as to whether Pacifica remains good law
even with respect to broadcasting.168 As Justice Thomas noted in his
Fox Television concurrence, modern broadcasting is no more per-
vasive than other media, and the existence of the V-chip now gives
parents who wish to screen out indecent content the ability to do
so.169 On remand, the Second Circuit echoed both of these concerns,
even going so far as to opine that the existence of effective filtering
technologies rendered restrictions on broadcast indecency unconsti-
tutional.170 In addition, as noted elsewhere, Pacifica provides little
purchase in a world increasingly dominated by video on demand, in
which receiving content requires the type of affirmative steps suf-
ficient to render indecency restrictions unconstitutional.171
165. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
166. 521 U.S. 844, 866-67, 869 n.33 (1997).
167. For a wide-ranging discussion of the ways that the Internet has changed since the
mid-1990s, see CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET (forthcoming 2012).
168. Yoo, supra note 14, at 303-06.
169. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1822 & n.* (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
170. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 326-27 (2d Cir. 2010).
171. Yoo, supra note 14, at 305-06.
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That said, the Second Circuit remains obligated to continue to
follow Pacifica until it is overruled by the Supreme Court.172 As a
result, the Second Circuit invalidated the FCC’s actions on the
alternative ground that the FCC’s indecency policy was unconstitu-
tionally vague.173 On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case for a second time, explicitly limited to whether
the FCC’s ban on indecent broadcast speech violates the First and
Fifth Amendments.174 The existence of the V-chip means that the
second grant of certiorari in this case should provide the Supreme
Court with another opportunity to reaffirm the classical liberal
vision of free speech. The presence of this alternative rationale
should allow the Supreme Court to resolve this case without having
to overrule Pacifica if it so chooses. In the meantime, lower courts
that are all too aware of Pacifica’s infirmities remain bound to
follow it until the Supreme Court declares otherwise.175
CONCLUSION
The advent of control is changing the face of the First Amend-
ment. Recent technological changes have raised serious doubts as
to the continuing constitutionality of many long-standing aspects of
the regulatory regime. On a more fundamental level, these develop-
ments are forcing courts and commentators to rethink the relation-
ship between free speech and liberal and democratic theory, pro-
viding an eloquent example of how technological change can give
new salience to theoretical debates that have long remained fallow.
Until those who advocate deviating from the traditional conception
of the First Amendment advance a theory strong enough to justify
overriding individual preferences and argue that private power
poses a greater threat than public power, strong reasons remain for
adhering to the classical liberal commitments implicit in the tra-
ditional approach to the First Amendment. 
172. Fox Television Stations, 613 F.3d at 327.
173. Id. at 327-35.
174. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011).
175. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, 613 F.3d at 327.
